Prigozhin has been a walking dead in oblivion. He thought he was the most powerful and untouchable comparable to Putin. He shares a contextual history like Gen Hamdan Dagalo of Sudan to some scenarios.
A good soldier must be political ideologically conscious. Prigozhin missed the concept.
Before the mutiny in June, he publicly stated through the media how the Russian defense ministry was not supplying him of ammunitions thus leaving his soldiers killed. He openly blamed the Russia Defense leadership of Shoigu. This is/was a direct threat to national security especially at a time of Russian invasion in Ukraine.
To those who are military & strategic security academicians understand how loyalty and security information are very vital and significant in socialists and authoritarian governments. He defied his boss (disloyalty) and spilled secrets.
Prigozhin’s mutiny highlighted political interests in which Russians gathered around him in Rostov conveying solidarity to his decision. This is was as strong indicator of his power rise. His powers and public trust prevailed. This weakend Putin on the international scene & in retaliation, Putin publicly angrily stated how Russia was funding Wagner and this was betrayal.
Prigozhin would be charged of treason and other criminal cases but he was rather exonerated in exchange of defecting the mutiny. This was a political negotiation and this happens between government and political opponents hence Prigozhin, in my opinion, by de facto became a political opponent armed with Wagner group. Due process of law didnt prevail.
Previously, and what I think catalyzed the ideologically disoriented mutiny was the futile plans of Putin having Prigozhin replaced in Ukraine as the head of PMC Wagner. This was the baseline of fundamental disarray between Putin & Prigozhin. When CIA/U.S were acquainted with this information, in my opinion, I think, they did what they did to fuel the dissent between Wagner Boss and Putin/Russian defense ministry. Prigozhin opted to rise to fame and power.
On the other side, if indeed Prigozhin was a threat to the U.S/CIA with no substantive events to relate with, such an aircraft crash incidence would be masterminded in a strong ally country where they would have the monopoly of information and details unfortunately it’s the reverse. Russia can decide which information to publish or not to.
Conclusively, in the power game, you must be carefull of how you switch alliances.
If your decision threatens the instability of a power structure yet you have to put into effect a chain of events that might yield unpredictable outcome, its then your head that could unwittingly find itself on the proverbial chopping bloc.
Power games and power structures are logical but not necessarily rational as not that every rational decision yields a good outcome—- the outcome maybe bad or good.
Aarons Mwesigye is a student of Political science at Kampala University.